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Abstract
This paper proposes a novel test of productive e¢ ciency in the household that also allows
a test of noncooperative decision making. I extend the collective model (Chiappori 1988, 1997)
to allow labor choices to a¤ect future bargaining power by raising the value of outside options.
Even if household consumption sharing is e¢ cient, labor choices are no longer e¢ cient. Using
data on Malawi, where there is predetermined variation in land rights that determine outside
options in marriage, I show that individuals spend more time on agricultural labor and less time
on wage labor when household land is theirs. They also have lower overall income and consump-
tion. The results are inconsistent with the fully e¢ cient collective model but consistent with a
noncooperative model with limited commitment, where individuals allocate their labor supply
to maximize future bargaining power. Limited commitment can lead to ine¢ cient allocations
that reduce household welfare.
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1 Introduction
In developing countries, it is paramount for households to allocate their limited resources as ef-
ciently as possible. Economic and social institutions, such as the rules governing kinship and
inheritance, may enable or constrain households in reaching e¢ cient allocations. Malawi is a
unique country because of its system of inheritance: around 60% of households are matrilineal and
follow descent through the female line, so that land is passed from mother to daughter at the time
of marriage, while the remainder are patrilineal and follow descent through the male line. In this
paper, I exploit this variation to evaluate whether land rights impact household e¢ ciency, and to
obtain broader insights about the role of limited commitment in the household.
The continued coexistence of matriliny and patriliny is interesting in its own right. Matrilineal
communities resisted active e¤orts to convert their inheritance system to patriliny by British colo-
nialists and religious missionaries in the early 20th century (Peters 1997, 2002). This suggests that
there may be e¢ ciency benets to the institution of matriliny.
I study the role of spousesland rights in the resource allocation of households in Malawi. In
particular, I show that matrilineal households allocate their time more productively than patrilineal
households, generating higher income and enjoying more consumption overall. I link these ndings
to economic theory: I analyze an extension to the standard collective model of household decision-
making (Chiappori 1988, 1992), which assumes e¢ cient household allocations. I allow for limited
commitment and noncooperative choices in labor supply. The empirical results reject production
e¢ ciency and are instead consistent with noncooperative choices in labor supply.
In closely related work, Udry (1996) rejects e¢ ciency in household production by comparing plot
yields of male- and female-controlled plots and Udry and Goldstein (2008) show that individuals
who have weak tenure security of their plots are less likely to leave their land fallow, which is
ine¢ cient. There are alternative models that explain ine¢ ciency as a result of noncooperative
behavior with limited commitment (Iyigun and Walsh 2007, Lundberg and Pollak 2003), but these
models have not been tested.
I consider a standard model of the household, which makes two decisions: rst, labor is allocated
in order to maximise the total amount of consumption generated (Chiappori 1997, Apps and Rees
1997); second, consumption is shared e¢ ciently between spouses according to a sharing rule that
depends on spousesoutside options. In this case, bargaining power should not a¤ect how labor is
allocated in the rst period, as long as the disutility from all types of labor (e.g. agricultural labor
and wage labor) is the same. I compare this prediction with a model where the rst period choice is
noncooperative because spouses are unable to commit to a particular labor allocation. Bargaining
power in the second period depends on previous labor allocation, because labor supply increases
the value of future income, which determines outside options. In this version of the model, labor
choices are no longer independent of distribution factors and are in general ine¢ cient: individuals
spend more time on the type of labor that most improves their outside option. This also results in
lower overall consumption available for sharing in the second period.
I test productive e¢ ciency by estimating how time allocation across di¤erent types of labor, and
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overall output, depend on predetermined variation in land ownership in Malawi. Malawi is a useful
laboratory for this test because of the coexistence of matriliny and patriliny. It is well established
in the literature that matrilineal women have strong outside options due to their access to land,
while men have strong outside options in patrilineal communities (Lamphere 1974, Johnson 1988,
Davison 1997).1 In addition, social norms dictate that men divide their working time between
agricultural labor and wage labor, while women specialise in agricultural labor.
According to the collective model, the identity of who owns the family land should not a¤ect
labor supply choices nor overall production levels, conditional on the productivity of di¤erent labor
types. Instead, I nd that men spend more time on agricultural labor (+1:5 hours per week) and
less time on wage labor ( 1:4 hours per week) when they are patrilineal, controlling for a rich
set of covariates, including temperature, rainfall and household-level soil quality. They generate
10% less consumption overall than matrilineal men. I nd that, consistent with an overinvestment
story, patrilineal men have substantially lower agricultural productivity than wages, and the wedge
between these two returns is larger for patrilineal men, compared to matrilineal men. These ndings
are di¢ cult to reconcile with an e¢ cient model, but are consistent with a mechanism where men
make noncooperative choices in labor supply because this raises their bargaining power in future
periods.
Patrilineal householdsincome could be increased if men reallocated their time away from their
land and towards wage labor. This nding is inconsistent with unobserved, higher agricultural
productivity in patrilineal communities, which would imply higher agricultural labor for patrilineal
men but also higher income. The di¤erence in labor supply and consumption between patrilineal
and matrilineal households is not observed for a placebo group of households that do not own any
land.
To address concerns over omitted variables that correlate with descent, labor and consumption,
I pursue several strategies. First, I control for a rich set of geographical, community and individual
characteristics, various measures of plot quality, colonial inuence and ethnic group characteristics,
and restrict the sample to areas where patrilineal and matrilineal groups are well mixed. The
estimates are also robust to conservative assumptions of selection on unobservables (Oster 2016,
Altonji, Elder and Taber 2005).
I discuss alternative interpretations of the results, in particular market failures, dynamic invest-
ment considerations and the role of marital residence and social norms. In the theoretical model,
I show that most standard market failures, such as credit constraints in agriculture, and imper-
fect insurance for risk in agricultural production, predict a di¤erent pattern of results to what is
observed empirically. There are, however, two alternative models that predict higher agricultural
labor and lower output in patrilineal households: transaction costs in the wage labor market and
tenure insecurity, if they are higher in patrilineal communities. In the empirical section, I show
1 I dene an individuals outside option as his or her utility when divorced because divorce is frequent and not
stigmatised in Malawi: lifetime divorce probabilities are between 40-65% and over 40% of women remarry within the
rst two years after a divorce (Reniers 2003). For societies where divorce is uncommon, an alternative outside option
is within-household noncooperation, as in the separate spheres model of Lundberg and Pollak (1993).
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that while there is evidence that transaction costs, such as bus fares and the distance to the nearest
government o¢ ce, do reduce wage labor and output and increase agricultural labor consistent with
the predictions of the theory, these costs cannot explain the estimated e¤ect of patriliny on labor
supply and consumption. This suggests that the empirical results are driven by noncooperative
decision making rather than this market failure. I nd no evidence that patrilineal households face
more tenure insecurity than matrilineal households.
The ndings produce several other interesting implications. First, the results in this paper
suggest an e¢ ciency gain to matrilineal descent. Matriliny has remained surprisingly prevalent in
Malawi, despite e¤orts by external groups to eradicate it. Matriliny weakens mens incentives to
overinvest in the land, which may be a potential reason for the persistence of matrilineal descent
to this day.2
Second, endogenous bargaining power leads to ine¢ cient decisions when there is limited com-
mitment. This suggests that there may be e¢ ciency gains to commitment devices in marriage, such
as prenuptial contracts that condition on labor supply choices. This coheres with recent ndings
on the potential e¢ ciency benets of prenuptial contracts in Voena (2015) and Bayot and Voena
(2015).
This paper contributes to the family economics literature by proposing a new test of e¢ ciency in
production decisions, rejecting the null hypothesis of e¢ ciency, and nding evidence for an extension
to the collective model that allows for limited commitment in the rst stage. Endogenous bargaining
power has been studied, for example, in a model where bargaining power is increasing in income
and education and decreasing in fertility for women; women are predicted to overinvest in their
education to make up for the negative e¤ect of having a child on the sharing rule (Iyigun and Walsh
2007). In an alternative model with limited commitment, couples make location choices in the rst
period, which advantage one spouse in their subsequent consumption share. Even if consumption
sharing is e¢ cient, the rst period location choice may not be (Lundberg and Pollak 2003). Finally,
bargaining power as determined by labor income has also been endogenized in a collective model
with no intertemporal commitment (Basu 2006). However, none of these papers provide empirical
evidence for ine¢ cient labor supply allocations due to endogenous bargaining power. The theory is
also related to a growing literature on noncooperative models of the household (Cherchye, Cosaert,
Demuynck and De Rock 2016, Lechene and Preston 2011, Chen and Woolley 2001).3
There is empirical evidence for noncooperative behavior in various contexts, including Kenya,
where men use their power over migration decisions to reduce the ability of their wives to earn their
own income (McPeak and Doss 2006), and Northern Cameroon, where women overinvest in those
crops whose income they control (Jones 1983). There is also evidence of a lack of consumption
smoothing in the household, with allocations depending on whether shocks a¤ect the husband
2This is consistent with a related literature on tenure insecurity and long-term investments in land: e.g. Besley
(1995), Place and Otsuka (2001), Kishindo (2010).
3The model also relates to Rainer (2007), who discusses theoretically the role of prenuptial contracts in a model
where individuals invest in a relationship-specic asset that determines individualsoutside options, and therefore
individualsbargaining power over the asset during marriage.
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or wife (Doss 2001, Duo and Udry 2004) and wives bearing a larger burden of adverse shocks
(Dercon and Krishnan 2000). In experimental contexts, spouses are observed to engage in income
hiding (Ashraf 2009), even if this reduces their expected income (Jakiela and Ozier 2016). This
paper provides a more general test of e¢ ciency in production by taking into account choices across
several types of labor income, rather than focusing only on agricultural work.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I discuss descent in Malawi. Section 3 outlines
the collective model of labor supply and consumption, as well as a noncooperative extension to
the collective model and alternative constraints such as market failures. In Section 4, I describe
the data and empirical approach. Section 5 presents the key empirical results. Section 6 considers
alternative mechanisms and Section 7 concludes.
2 Background
In rural Malawi, individuals belong to ethnic groups (sometimes referred to as tribes), whose rules
are important for family life. Ethnic groups follow either matrilineal or patrilineal descent, and
of the eleven main ethnic groups, six are matrilineal and ve are patrilineal (Spring 1995). In a
matrilineal household, the woman traditionally receives land from her mother when she marries,
which she keeps if the couple divorce (Berge et al. 2014, Peters 2010, Davison 1997).4 The husband
has no rights to this land.5 Note that this di¤ers from other matrilineal societies studied in the
literature (e.g. La Ferrara 2007), where land passes from brother to sisters son.6 In patrilineal
households, the opposite happens: men receive land from their families on marriage and keep this
land if the couple divorce, with the woman returning to her family. Divorce matters: Malawi has
one of the highest divorce rates on the continent, with one in two marriages dissolving (Reniers
2003).
I interpret descent as a measure of outside options, because its most important role is in deter-
mining land inheritance at the time of marriage. However, there may be other economically salient
features of descent that could drive labor supply and consumption allocations, such as succession
to political rank or status (Adams 1999). It will be important to show that the results obtained in
the empirical section are not driven by the role of descent in succession to political o¢ ce.
Figure 1, a map of Malawi, depicts the dispersion of descent by district.7 Darker shading
represents districts where matriliny is more common. In the Southern region, most districts are
over 50% matrilineal. In the Central region, there is a similar number of matrilineal and patrilineal
4Matrilineal households also tend to be matrilocal, with the husband locating in the wifes village on marriage,
while patrilineal households tend to be patrilocal (the wife moves to the husbands village).
5There are cases of men purchasing land in matrilineal communities, but this is overwhelmingly to give it to their
daughters when they marry (Berge et al. 2014, Peters 2010).
6Although land is shared based on descent following divorce, consumption goods tend to be shared equally on
divorce. Child custody tends to follow descent rules, so going to matrilineal women and patrilineal men.
7The prevalence of matriliny and patriliny by district is calculated based on the Living Standards Measurement
Study data used in the empirical section of this paper. For the purposes of this map, in those villages where both
types of descent are practised, half of the households are apportioned matrilineal descent while half are apportioned
patrilineal descent. The gures are weighted based on the sampling strategy of the data (see footnote 27).
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Figure 1: A map of Malawi depicting the prevalence of matriliny and patriliny by district.
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people, while the Northern region is mostly patrilineal. This somewhat uneven dispersion of descent
will be addressed in the robustness checks.
Table 1 describes the characteristics of matrilineal and patrilineal households. The average
landholding size and household size are not signicantly di¤erent across descent types, although
patrilineal household heads are signicantly better educated. Consistent with the anthropological
literature, divorce rates are highest in matrilineal communities.8 The table also shows that women
own signicantly more land and men own signicantly less land, on average, in matrilineal compared
to patrilineal households (p-values  0:001). Since the total amount of land owned by households
is not signicantly di¤erent across these descent types, this implies that women own a greater share
of household land on average in matrilineal compared to patrilineal households, while the opposite
is true for men.
Labor allocation in rural Malawi is a¤ected by gender-based social norms. Almost all households
derive a substantial amount of their income from agriculture, with women tending to engage in
agricultural labor and performing many tasks on their own (Hirschmann and Vaughan 1983).9 ;10
Men usually work both on the land and for wages.11 It is rare for women to work for wages, unless
they are unmarried (Spring 1995), so that men are predominantly responsible for providing the
households consumption goods (Schatz 2002). On the other hand, domestic labor is predominantly
carried out by women (Spring 1995). These patterns are evident in Table 1. Also, patrilineal men
spend more time on agricultural labor and less time on wage labor, on average, than matrilineal
men; the wage labor di¤erence is signicant at the 1% level.12 Women and men spend similar
amounts of time on agricultural labor; the rest of womens time is devoted to domestic work.13
Matrilineal households are better o¤ than patrilineal households in every region, in terms of real
aggregate household expenditure (Table 1). In Malawi, the di¤erence in mean expenditure between
matrilineal and patrilineal households is 11% and statistically signicant (p-value = 0:003).
8The divorce rate is measured at the district level. It is calculated from the full IHS sample and represents the
proportion of household heads who report being separated or divorced. The gures are consistent with those in
Reniers (2003), calculated from the 2001 Demographic and Health Survey of Malawi.
9This is di¤erent from the setting in Udry (1996), where men and women control separate plots.
10Maize is the most commonly farmed crop, followed by pigeonpea and tobacco (in terms of the number of house-
holds reporting that they farm it).
11Wage labor refers to any work for a salary, commission or in-kind payment, excluding agricultural activities on
other farms. A typical task might be brick-laying.
12See Walther (2017) for a detailed analysis of how husbands and wives in Malawi allocate their time.
13Domestic labour is time spent fetching water and rewood. The questionnaire did not ask about more typical
domestic tasks like cooking and cleaning. In addition, there is no data on leisure, which is why the total number of
hours is not equal to the number of hours in a week.
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3 Theoretical Framework
In order to determine whether household behavior in Malawi is e¢ cient, I describe the canonical
collective model of the household (Chiappori 1998, 1992) with and without market failures, and
derive predictions on how labor supply and output relate to descent rules. I then describe alternative
models and their implications for labor supply and output: the existence of transaction costs in
the wage labor market, credit constraints for agricultural inputs, imperfect insurance, dynamic
incentives, and, nally, a model of noncooperative decision making in labor supply.
3.1 The Collective Model with Market Failures
The collective model assumes that household decisions are made e¢ ciently, so that allocations
can be modelled as the result of maximising household welfare with Pareto weights on individual
utilities. These Pareto weights represent the relative power of individuals in the decision-making
process and are driven by distribution factors, which are variables that do not a¤ect income or
preferences but do a¤ect outside options and bargaining power.
A household consists of a husband (a) and wife (b) who both enjoy consuming a vector of private
goods x. Their utilities are ui(xi) for i = a; b. The prices of private goods are a vector p.
Each household member spends ni hours working for wages wi and hi hours working on the
family land.14 Agricultural labor yields output AF (h), where A is a measure of agricultural pro-
ductivity. This output can be sold to the market at price q. The households income is then
y = w  n+ qAF (h). A parsimonious way of describing additional constraints that households may
face is to assume that the household acts as if it faces household-specic shadow prices (Singh,
Squire and Strauss 1986). In this case, the budget constraint has household-specic prices of wage
labor, w^, and agricultural output, q^:
p 
X
xi = w^  n+ q^AF (h). (1)
Normalizing total time to one, the time allocation constraint is
ni + hi = 1;8i: (2)
The collective model of household choices is
max
fx;h;ng
(z)ua(xa) + ub(xb) subject to (1) and (2), (3)
where (z) is the husbands Pareto weight and z is a vector of distribution factors that reect
bargaining power.
Following Chiappori (1997), a necessary condition for solving (3) is prot maximization by a
14 I write n = (na; nb), h = (ha; hb) and w = (wa; wb) for the vectors of allocations and wages.
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hypothetical "household rm" that produces agricultural output and hires labor:
 = max
h
q^AF (h)  w^  h: (4)
Hence, optimal choices of agricultural labor h are determined by productivity and the household-
specic price of agricultural products and wage:
q^A
dF (h)
dh
= w^: (5)
When there are no additional constraints and markets are complete, q^ = q and w^ = w, so that
condition (5) simplies to
qA
dF (h)
dh
= w: (6)
When there are no market failures, the labor supply choice h is independent of the sharing rule
 and any distribution factors z.15 A central empirical prediction of the collective model without
market failures is that, controlling for productivity and prices, descent systems will not a¤ect the
share of time spent on agricultural labor, nor the total output of the household. Moreover, the
model predicts that the share of each household members time spent on agricultural labor will (i)
increase with agricultural prices or productivities, and (ii) decrease with market wages.
A challenge in testing the prediction of the collective model that labor supply and output
are independent of descent rules is that we cannot perfectly measure agricultural productivity or
land quality. If there are residual (unobserved) productivity di¤erences across descent systems,
we might wrongly attribute resulting di¤erences in labor allocations to descent itself, leading to
a false rejection of e¢ ciency. This issue can be addressed by conducting an additional test on
overall levels of household consumption.16 The collective model predicts that households in more
productive regions dedicate more time to agricultural labor, and also enjoy a higher level of overall
household consumption due to their superior productivity. In other words, in the presence of
residual di¤erences in agricultural productivity, the collective model predicts that agricultural labor
shares and overall consumption will be positively correlated across descent systems.17
When there are market failures, condition (5) says that the household may supply more or
less agricultural labor, as compared to under the optimality condition (6): the key quantity is the
relative shadow price w^q^ , which determines whether there is any deviation from the unconstrained
15This result is very general; see Chiappori (1997) and Apps and Rees (1997).
16 I assume that savings are negligible, so that output equals consumption. Brune, Giné, Goldberg and Yang (2016)
study farmers in Malawi and nd average savings of approximately 8.4 days worth of household expenditure.
17Note that these predictions are robust to introducing leisure in the model. Suppose that there are no market
failures and individuals enjoy consuming goods x and leisure l, with utility ui(xi; li) and time allocation constraint
ni + hi = 1  li; 8i:
The household rms problem is unchanged, so it remains the case that agricultural labor choices h are fully determined
by prices and productivity. The result generalises to di¤erent e¤ort costs of wage and agricultural labour, but not if
these e¤ort costs also vary between patrilineal and matrilineal households.
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optimum.18 Any friction that constrains wage labor, n; will lead to w^q^ <
w
q and therefore an
oversupply of agricultural labor. Any friction that constrains agricultural production will lead
to w^q^ >
w
q ; and an undersupply of agricultural labor. These constraints also have implications
for overall output: the presence of a (binding) constraint will always act to reduce overall output.
The next section elaborates on several common market failures and their predictions for the corre-
lation between descent systems, labor supply and output. I also analyze a model of noncooperative
decision making in labor supply. As will be discussed in Section 5.1, the empirical results are con-
sistent with the model of noncooperative decision making, and inconsistent with both the e¢ cient
collective model and with several common types of market failures.
3.2 Alternative Mechanisms
The collective model with household-specic shadow prices can be used to understand the impli-
cations of various market failures for labor supply and output.
1. Transaction costs in the wage labor market
The assumption of complete markets has been frequently rejected in the context of developing
countries (Kevane 1996, Udry 1998, LaFave and Thomas 2016, although also see Pitt and Rosen-
zweig 1986). As an alternative, consider the role of transaction costs in the wage labor market.
Assume a pecuniary loss  per unit of wage labor supplied by the husband. This formulation
captures direct costs such as bus fares, and can also represent a binding quantity constraint, such
as the inability to work more than a given number of hours for wages. The latter interpretation
follows if  is a household-specic Lagrange multiplier on the quantity constraint.
The budget constraint with a transaction cost is
p 
X
xi  (w   )  n+ qAF (h):
When this constraint binds, the household specic shadow wage is w^ = w   , which yields the
household rms rst-order condition:
qA
dF (h)
dh
= w    : (7)
Therefore, households that face worse market failures (a higher ) supply more agricultural
labor and less wage labor. These households will also have lower consumption: using the binding
18Note that we are assuming no market for land, similar to Bardhan and Udry (1999). The e¤ect of this is that
separability between consumption and production breaks down, as households face two constraints. If they only faced
one constraint (e.g. a land market existed but there was a binding constraint on the number of wage labor hours),
then separability would hold, but the households choice of agricultural and wage labor would still be a¤ected by the
constraint.
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budget constraint, the value of total expenditure at the optimal allocation is
Y = (w   )  1 + max
h
;
where  = qAF (h)  (w   )  h. It is straightforward to show that @Y@ < 0, and total income
declines with transaction costs in the wage labor market. Thus, households that face worse wage
labor transaction costs will supply more agricultural labor and consume less.
2. Credit constraints for agricultural inputs
Suppose that there is another input to agricultural production (e.g. fertilizer), which is needed
in addition to labor to produce output. For simplicity, I assume that this input costs   h: the
household pays for fertilizer per unit of labor supplied.19 A higher  can capture agricultural
frictions that raise costs (e.g. transport costs to the location where fertilizer is sold). As with wage
labor transaction costs, we can also interpret  as a Lagrange multiplier on a constraint, where a
higher  can capture tighter quantity constraints on agricultural inputs, or credit constraints for
purchasing agricultural inputs. For example, for every unit of h the household needs one unit of
fertilizer, which costs pf , and it can only obtain at most B units of working credit to pay for this
input. Then we have a quantity constraint pfh  B or h  B=pf . Interpreting  as the Lagrange
multiplier on this constraint, a higher  corresponds to a lower borrowing limit B.
Regardless of whether  is interpreted as a direct cost or as a Lagrange multiplier, it is straight-
forward to see that the household acts as if it faced the following modied budget constraint:
p 
X
xi  w  n+ qAF (h)    h:
This, combined with h + n = 1, gives a shadow price of wage labor w^ = w +  , which makes
wage labor relatively more attractive. Households facing worse market failures in terms of credit
for agricultural input (higher  ) will supply less agricultural labor, more wage labor and consume
less. This is a di¤erent pattern of labor supply from that predicted by wage labor transaction costs,
which predicts less consumption and more agricultural labor among more constrained households.
3. Imperfect insurance
Suppose that agricultural production is risky and there is imperfect insurance available for this
risk. In this situation, the household will demand an e¤ective risk premium when investing in the
risky production technology through its labor choice - in this case, agriculture. Heuristically, this
would correspond to a household shadow price of agricultural output q^ that is e¤ectively the true
q minus a risk premium, and hence lower than the expected market price q. The e¤ect is to reduce
a households agricultural labor supply. Overall output will also decline. For a formal discussion of
this e¤ect, see Bardhan and Udry (1999, chapter 2).20
19This perfect complementarity with labor simplies the exposition but can be relaxed in a straightforward way.
20We can also introduce risk in wage labor: for example, there is uncertainty about the wage a person will be paid.
For a risk averse household facing two sources of risk, it will prefer to invest in the technology with lower risk. It is
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4. Dynamic investment incentives and tenure insecurity
Next, suppose that markets function well but there are dynamic investment incentives. In
particular, agricultural labor today can increase the productivity of agricultural labor tomorrow
(e.g. by increasing the productivity of the land). This model is derived formally in Online Appendix
B. Households with a high future productivity return to todays agricultural labor will supply
more agricultural labor in early life and less wage labor. A high future productivity return also
raises lifetime income, since the investment opportunity raises the (maximized) present value of the
rms prots. Assuming that consumption in both periods is a normal good, and nancial markets
allow the smoothing of consumption, households with strong investment incentives in agriculture
(motivated by future productivity increases) will supply more agricultural labor early on, and
produce more throughout the lifecycle.21 ;22
A reinterpretation of this model is that land tenure is not secure, but security can be improved
by investing in the land (as in Besley 1995). Households with a higher expropriation risk will
supply more agricultural labor to prevent future loss of productivity, but they consume less overall
because a higher expropriation risk increases losses all else equal, and reduces the present value of
the household rm.
This latter model could be interpreted in terms of fallow periods: land is more productive at
time 1 if left fallow (lower agricultural labor) at time 0. In this case, the optimal, prot maximizing
choice is to leave land fallow and supply less agricultural labor in the rst period. This in itself
is not a constraint. Rather, di¤erences between the labor supply and output of patrilineal and
matrilineal households can arise if they face di¤erent constraints to fallowing. For example, if
patrilineal households are unable to leave land fallow (e.g. if they face tenure insecurity), then they
will supply more agricultural labor than matrilineal households and produce less output, given that
fallowing is optimal.
5. Noncooperative choices and limited commitment
As an alternative model, suppose that markets are complete, but e¢ cient household bargaining
occurs after agricultural output and wage income has been earned. In an initial stage, the household
members unilaterally choose their labor allocation. This setup describes a situation where it is not
possible to make binding commitments about ones labor supply. Assume further that only the
plausible to assume that agricultural output is more uncertain than wages, so that wage labor will still be preferred
over agricultural labor by households facing these two types of uncertainty. Only where wages are more uncertain
than agricultural output, will the e¤ect be to reduce wage labor and increase agricultural labor.
21The case where nancial markets are imperfect and do not allow consumption smoothing is also discussed in
Online Appendix B.
22Note that the opposite prediction holds if we assume productivity gains to wage labor. For example, higher
wage labor may generate human capital that raises future wages. If this is the case, households with a higher human
capital gain from wage labor will supply more wage labor and consume more overall. This e¤ect seems less likely to
apply in the Malawi context, where rural households tend to engage in low-skilled occupations such as brick-laying.
In addition, if households face both types of incentives - an investment return to wage labor and to agricultural labor
- then they will prefer the activity where the feedback e¤ect is higher. This is likely to be agricultural labor.
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husband makes a labor supply decision. This is justied by the empirical fact that women in Malawi
engage in little to no wage labor; see Table 1.
At the bargaining stage, the household takes its income y = wn+ qAF (h) as given; n, h and w
refer to the husbands allocation and wages. Since bargaining is e¢ cient, the household solves
xi = arg max
x

ui(x) subject to p  x = si(z)y	 ;
where z are distribution factors and si is the share of income allocated to member i, which is
commensurate with is bargaining power (and which satises sa(z) + sb(z) = 1). This is equivalent
to the maximisation problem in (3) (see e.g. Browning, Chiappori and Weiss 2014).
Bargaining power depends on the incomes that spouses would enjoy outside of marriage. These
are determined by the formal laws and social norms governing divorce. Upon divorce, the husband
obtains a share  2 [0; 1] of household wage income, and a share  2 [0; 1] of agricultural income.
To formalize the e¤ect of outside options on bargaining power, let z = [(wn) + qAF (h)] =y
denote the share of household income obtained by the husband in case of divorce, and assume that
the sharing rule at the bargaining stage satises sa = (z) and sb = 1   (z), where d=dz >
0. Relative income is commonly used as a distribution factor in the literature (e.g. Browning,
Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene 1994, Hoddinott and Haddad 1995), justied by empirical
results that reject income pooling (Lundberg, Pollak and Wales 1997, Thomas 1990). Divorce laws
and control of land have also been used as distribution factors (Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix 2002,
and Udry 1996, respectively).23
The husbands indirect utility, as a function of bargaining power z and household income y, is
therefore
V (y; z) = max
x
fua(x) subject to p  x = (z)yg :
At the labor allocation stage, he solves
max
h;n

V (y; z) subject to y = wn+ qAF (h), z =
(wn) + qAF (h)
wn+ qAF (h)
and h+ n = 1

:
The rst-order condition for optimality24 can be written as
dy
dn
=
dy
dh
+ y

dz
dh
  dz
dn

0(z)
(z)
: (8)
The e¢ cient choice is to equalize the marginal products of wage and agricultural labor: dy=dn =
dy=dh; or w = qA@F (h)@h , as in equation (6). In the current setting, however, agricultural labor yields
an additional benet for the husband if it increases his bargaining power by more than wage labor
does. This e¤ect is captured by the second term in (8), and it leads the husband to oversupply
23See the discussion on distribution factors in chapter 5 of Browning, Chiappori and Weiss 2014.
24Obtained by maximising (z)y with respect to h and n subject to the constraint h+ n = 1.
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agricultural labor.25
The division of output upon divorce is now crucial for household e¢ ciency. Evaluating dz=dh
and dz=dn and substituting into (8), we have
w = qA
dF (h)
dh
+ (  )

F (h) + n
dF (h)
dh

qAw
y
0(z)
(z)
: (9)
It is clear that the husband over-supplies agricultural labor if and only if  > , because in this case
dy
dh <
dy
dn , so that a marginal reallocation from h to n would increase y. Further, the e¢ cient choice
maximises household output and therefore consumption, so that any deviation from the e¢ cient
choice results in lower overall consumption, even if one spouse obtains a higher share of it.
A central empirical prediction of this model is that ine¢ cient choices can occur if post-divorce
resource allocation of one type of income is not equal to post-divorce resource allocation of another
type of income. In this case, labor allocation is skewed towards earning the type of income that
most improves the spouses outside option. This mechanism is distinct from the model of dynamic
investment incentives, where agricultural labor today a¤ects the productivity of agricultural labor
tomorrow, rather than bargaining power.
In Malawi, the two key types of male labor are agricultural labor and wage labor (Table 1).
Agricultural labor improves the value of land, both because of future crops that can be harvested,
and because conservation e¤orts can reduce erosion and thus improve the fertility of the land.
Therefore, in patrilineal households, where men keep most of the land on divorce, higher levels of
agricultural labor are expected, relative to matrilineal households, where men own a smaller share
of the land. These land shares can be seen in Table 1:  is the share of household land owned
by the husband, which is signicantly higher in patrilineal, compared to matrilineal households.
Consistent with this argument, men control a greater number of plots and more revenue from crop
sales in patrilineal households than matrilineal households, while the opposite is true of women,
who control a larger value of crop sales in matrilineal households (Table 10 in Online Appendix A).
With an additional assumption on how wage income is shared on divorce, the model also
has empirical predictions regarding household consumption. Suppose that wage income is shared
equally on divorce - this is not unreasonable, as recent judicial changes have resulted in courts
ordering equal division of purchases such as movable property and personal belongings following
divorce (Mwambene 2005). Using the average share of land owned by the husband in Table 1 as a
measure of , greater ine¢ ciency is expected for patrilineal households, because the wedge between
 and  is greater. This implies lower household consumption for patrilineal than matrilineal
households.
25Note that this implicitly assumes that agricultural labour generates agricultural income (i.e. dy
dh
> 0), and descent
() determines how agricultural income a¤ects the outside option. The value of agricultural labor is in fact the value
of future harvested crops. Clearly these are tied to the land. Agricultural labor can also raise the value of the land
indirectly through soil conservation measures, for example. In fact, there is a substantial literature documenting that
matrilineal men invest less in household land (Place and Otsuka 2001, Lovo 2016, Kishindo 2010).
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3.3 Summary
The collective model with separation of consumption and production and no additional constraints
predicts that households will maximize prots in production by setting the marginal product of
their agricultural labor equal to the wage.
An alternative model is noncooperative decision making in labor supply with feedback to future
bargaining power, which predicts that men who own their land (patrilineal) will tend to oversupply
agricultural labor relative to men who do not (matrilineal), undersupply wage labor, and produce
less overall for the household to consume or sell. There are two alternative mechanisms, driven
by market failures, that generate similar predictions to noncooperative decision-making: transac-
tion costs in the wage labor market and tenure inscurity. If patrilineal men face more stringent
constraints in the wage labor market or higher tenure insecurity, they will tend to oversupply
agricultural labor and generate less income overall.
The remaining mechanisms discussed above generate predictions that are at odds with noncoop-
erative decision making, and with the empirical results in Section 5.1, which show that patrilineal
men allocate more time to agricultural labor, less time to wage labor, and generate less income for
household consumption. In order to show that the empirical ndings are driven by noncooperative
decision making and not by di¤erences in wage labor costs, tenure insecurity or fallowing opportu-
nities across patrilineal and matrilineal households, additional tests of these alternative mechanisms
are provided in Section 6.
4 Data and Estimating Equations
The data are from the Malawi Third Integrated Household Survey (IHS 2013). I restrict the
sample to rural and married households. Descent is identied based on the following question: "Do
individuals in this community trace their descent through their father, their mother, or are both
kinds of descent traced?" I dene a household to be patrilineal if the answer is "father", matrilineal
if the answer is "mother", and mixed if the answer is "both".26
Labor supply information is provided in the form of time allocation in the previous week,
including agricultural work on household land and working for wages. In the main analysis, I focus
on consumption rather than income. This is for two reasons: rst, the consumption data I use
are far richer than the income data, and second, consumption is less susceptible to shocks than
income, hence painting a more accurate portrait of householdseconomic well-being (Deaton and
26Although identication of descent is e¤ectively at the community level, this is unlikely to result in measurement
error because of two reasons: rst, the most common reason for migration is marriage, and second, marriage across
descent types is extremely rare. In the IHS, approximately 50% of spouses live in the village of their birth, and
of those that have moved, 45% report marriage as the reason, while the next most common reason is moving with
parents, presumably when they were children. For these households, descent in the current village of residence is
the same as descent at birth. For the remaining households, it could be that more productive spouses move from
patrilineal to matrilineal villages. This possibility is addressed in the analysis of individual wages in Section 5.2,
which shows that patrilineal mens predicted wages are higher than matrilineal mens predicted wages at all points
in the distribution.
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Zaidi 2002). All consumption expenditure is deated by a temporal and spatial price index. I also
report results on income to verify that they are consistent with the consumption results.
To evaluate the e¤ect of descent on labor allocation, I estimate the following equation:
hi;c;d;r = 0 + 1Pc;d;r + 2 lnwi;c;d;r +G
0
i;c;d;r3 +X
0
i;c;d;r4 + "i;c;d;r: (10)
I estimate this equation for ve di¤erent dependent variables: weekly total hours of income-
earning labor, agricultural hours, wage hours, the di¤erence between agricultural and wage hours
and their sum. The coe¢ cient of interest in each case is 1: The unit of observation is the household
i, and communities are indexed by c, districts by d and regions by r. Pk;d;r is a dummy variable
that equals one if the households community is patrilineal and zero if it is not. I also include a
dummy variable for mixed descent villages, so that the coe¢ cient 1 captures the average di¤erence
between patrilineal and matrilineal households. I cluster all standard errors at the community level,
weight the regressions based on the sampling strategy and take account of the fact that I am using
a subpopulation of the full sample.27
I also include a vector of geographical controls, Gi;c;d;r. In addition to several measures of
soil quality at the household level, I include community-level measures of rainfall, temperature
and greenness, which measures the onset and duration of spring. The intention is to control for
characteristics that a¤ect the productivity of agriculture and the suitability of the land for di¤erent
crops, and that may also be correlated with descent. The vector Xi;c;d;r consists of additional
individual-level, community-level, district-level and region-level covariates.28 ;29
This specication also controls for the logarithm of husbandswages, lnwi;c;d;r. The observed
wage may overestimate the underlying distribution of wage o¤ers. I estimate a Heckman selection
model (Heckman 1979) for observed wages, calculate the predicted wage for each husband in the
sample and use this in place of the observed wage.30
27 I cluster at the community level because while communities are selected randomly, the variable of interest (descent)
is measured at the community level, which may induce correlation in errors between households in a given community.
With regard to the use of weights, I follow the guidance in Deaton (1997, p. 72), which suggests the use of an auxiliary
regression to test whether slope parameters vary with weights, which is the case here.
28These are listed in the notes to each results table. Some of these - such as household composition and land owned
- could be choice variables. Online Appendix A.3 reports the main estimates without these control variables, the
omission of which has no impact on the estimated e¤ect of descent on outcomes.
29Among other variables, this also includes the average crop choices of other households in the village. In fact, a
regression of household crop choices on descent and control variables similar to equation (11) shows that patrilineal
and matrilineal households do not di¤er signicantly in their crop choices, except that patrilineal households are less
likely to report tobacco as their main crop - see Online Appendix A.2.
30The exclusion variables should not a¤ect the wage an individual receives but should a¤ect the probability that an
individual works in the wage sector. I use the number of acres of land inherited by the husband, the number inherited
by the wife, their squares, the distance to the nearest bus stop and the fare to the districts government o¢ ces
(boma), descent, religion and geographical variables such as soil quality and rainfall, as instruments for participation
in wage labor. In a regression of log wage on covariates and these exclusion variables, they are not signicant. All
exclusion variables signicantly predict wage participation in the selection equation. The results yield an estimate
of  = 0:40, suggesting the presence of selection bias. Online Appendix A.3 reports the main estimates without
controlling for the predicted wage; this does not change the estimated e¤ect of descent on labor allocation.
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Table 2: The estimated e¤ect of descent on labor supply
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Husbands Labor Supply Total Agricultural Wage Agric.
-Wage
Agric.
+Wage
Patrilineal 0.097 1.453 -1.386 2.840 0.067
(1.065) (0.682) (0.831) (1.141) (1.005)
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y Y
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
Community controls Y Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 7203 7203 7203 7203 7203
Number of community clusters 628 628 628 628 628
R2 0.138 0.177 0.184 0.200 0.153
Standard errors are clustered by community and reported in parentheses.  denotes signicance at 1% level,  at 5%
level and  at 10% level. The geographical controls are temperature, rainfall, greenness and soil quality, which are listed
in Online Appendix D. The individual controls are the natural log of the husbands predicted wage from a Heckman
selection model, acres of land farmed, the heads age, age squared, education level and gender, the number of male
children, female children, male adults, female adults, male elderly and female elderly in the household, dummy variables
measuring the month and year of the interview, and the households distance to the nearest road. The community
controls are a dummy variable for the existence of a womens group, the presence of immigrants, the presence of wage or
business labour opportunities, and the proportion of households that farm maize, tobacco, groundnut, rice and mango.
All regressions also include dummy variables for the Southern and Central regions and the district-level divorce rate.
The estimating equation for consumption outcomes is
lnCi;c;d;r = 0 + 1Pc;d;r +G
0
i;c;d;r2 +X
0
i;c;d;r3 + "i;c;d;r; (11)
where I use the logarithm of various measures of household expenditure as the dependent variable,
Ci;c;d;r. The coe¢ cient of interest is 1, which measures the percentage di¤erence in household
expenditure between patrilineal and matrilineal households.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Key Results
The e¤ect of descent on husbandslabor supply is reported in Table 2. The results are consistent
with the noncooperative model, and inconsistent with the fully e¢ cient collective model. Patrilineal
men spend, on average, 1:45 hours more per week on agricultural labor and 1:39 hours less per
week on wage labor, which represents a 12:5% increase and 26:3% reduction relative to baseline,
respectively. These di¤erences appear to be driven by substitution between wage and agricultural
labor: we cannot reject that these coe¢ cients are the same but opposite sign. Indeed, the sum of
agriultural and wage labor hours is not signicantly di¤erent across descent types (column (5)).31
31Sensitivity to the inclusion of controls is reported in Table 12 in Online Appendix A.
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Table 3: The estimated e¤ect of descent on consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(exp) Ln(pc
exp)
Ln(equiv
exp)
Ln(purchase)Ln(public) Ln(private)
Patrilineal -0.099 -0.100 -0.097 -0.132 -0.127 -0.089
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.036) (0.031) (0.034)
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Community controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 7203 7203 7203 7203 7203 7203
Number of community clusters 628 628 628 628 628 628
R2 0.370 0.368 0.349 0.322 0.352 0.325
Standard errors are clustered by community and reported in parentheses.  denotes signicance at 1% level,  at
5% level and  at 10% level. The geographical controls are temperature, rainfall, greenness and soil quality, which
are listed in Online Appendix D. The individual controls are acres of land farmed, the heads age, age squared,
education level and gender, the number of male children, female children, male adults, female adults, male elderly and
female elderly in the household, dummy variables measuring the month and year of the interview, and the households
distance to the nearest road. The community controls are a dummy variable for the existence of a womens group, the
presence of immigrants, the presence of wage or business labour opportunities, and the proportion of households that
farm maize, tobacco, groundnut, rice and mango. All regressions also include dummy variables for the Southern and
Central regions and the district-level divorce rate.
The e¤ect of descent on household consumption is reported in Table 3. Regression (1) estimates
the e¤ect of patriliny on the logarithm of real household expenditure, which is the variable that was
summarized in Table 1. As with labor supply, there is a signicant di¤erence in the consumption
levels of patrilineal and matrilineal households. Patrilineal households have 9:9% lower household
expenditure than matrilineal households, and this result is statisticaly signicant. This nding
suggests that patrilineal households make less e¢ cient labor supply choices, resulting in lower
overall consumption.32
These ndings are robust to using di¤erent measures of consumption: patrilineal households
have signicantly lower per capita consumption (column (2)) and equivalent consumption (column
(3)). The di¤erence between matrilineal and patrilineal householdsconsumption from purchases
is 13:2%, larger than the di¤erence for all consumption (column (4)). This is interesting because
the noncooperative model predicts that matrilineal husbands engage in more wage labor, which
generates cash income. The di¤erence in purchases is consistent with this hypothesis. Patrilineal
households have lower private and public expenditure (columns (5) and (6)), but particularly public
expenditure, which includes items such as durables that are typically shared equally on divorce.
The signicant e¤ect of descent on labor supply allocations and household consumption is in-
consistent with the fully e¢ cient collective model, which predicts that distribution factors should
not matter for the e¢ cient allocation of household production. Instead, these results are consis-
32Sensitivity to control variables is reported in Table 13 in Online Appendix A.
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Table 4: Measures of wages and agricultural productivity
Labor type Return (MWK per hour)
Means Medians
Patrilineal Matrilineal Patrilineal Matrilineal
Predicted Wage, husbands 76:96 75:99 58:82 52:50
Number of observations (N) 2472 4448 2472 4448
Average Product of Agricultural Labory 60:12 60:34 36:17 39:74
N 2386 4300 2386 4300
MASAF Wage, malesyy 49:05 48:83 50 50
N 2472 4448 2472 4448
Ratio: Predicted Wage / APAL 11:11 5:57 1:43 1:30
N 2002 3938 2002 3938
yof household member. yyHourly rates are obtained by dividing the daily rate by four (tasks typically
take four hours; see Goldberg 2015).
tent with the noncooperative model, suggesting that individuals invest in their outside options to
increase future bargaining power. Next, I explore the di¤erence between wages and agricultural
productivity to provide a further test of productive e¢ ciency, and conduct a placebo test among
households that own no land.
5.2 The Di¤erence between Wages and Agricultural Productivity
Recall that equation (9) predicted a wedge between the marginal agricultural product and the
wage that was increasing in ( ), suggesting that patrilineal men should have a bigger di¤erence
between the agricultural product and wage than matrilineal men. Table 4 reports the mean and
median values of husbandspredicted wages from the Heckman selection model, as well as estimates
of the average agricultural product (APAL); the last row shows the ratio of the predicted wage to the
average agricultural product, and both the average and median ratios are higher for patrilineal than
matrilineal men.33 There is also a non-zero wedge between matrilineal mens wages and agricultural
product, suggesting ine¢ cient labor allocations among matrilineal households as well.34
The collective model predicts that households in more productive regions dedicate more time
to agricultural labor, and also enjoy a higher level of overall household consumption due to their
33 I assume that the average agricultural product is the same for all household members. This is a simplifying
assumption that ensures identication of the agricultural product, because it is not possible to identify how much of
consumption from own production came from the labor of each individual household member.
34To calculate the agricultural product, I divide the sum of the estimated value of consumption from own production,
and agricultural sales revenue in the last year, by the number of hours of own-farm agricultural labor by all household
members in the last year. As labor supply information is recorded for the past week, I multiply this by 52, but this
is likely to be a¤ected by seasonality. To overcome this problem, I calculate the median agricultural hours across
households in each Traditional Authority area (TA) for each month (i.e. weekly hours multiplied by 4.3), on the
condition that there are at least four households observed in every month of the year in that TA. I then calculate
the annual agricultural hours for each TA as the total of the median hours in each month; this is used in place of the
households weekly hours.
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Figure 2: The average logarithm of the predicted wage of patrilineal and matrilineal husbands at
each quintile.
superior productivity. Di¤erences in agricultural productivity do not explain the key empirical
results: patrilineal households have lower consumption, although they engage in more agricultural
labor. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 show that the median agricultural product is lower in patrilineal
than matrilineal households. This is in line with the nding that patrilineal households spend more
time on agriculture than matrilineal households, hence lowering their agricultural productivity.35
Alternatively, suppose that matrilineal husbands have higher productivity in wage labor. Al-
though the labor supply regressions control for the husbands predicted wage, we can exclude this
mechanism more clearly by analyzing the predicted wage in Table 4. The estimates show that
the median patrilineal wage is higher than the median matrilineal wage. Figure 2 is a plot of the
natural log of husbandswages: patrilineal husbandsaverage wages are higher than matrilineal
husbandsaverage wages at every quintile. This contradicts the hypothesis that the results can be
explained by higher wages of matrilineal husbands.36 Table 4 also shows the median hourly wage for
men paid by the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) public works programme for comparison.37
The MASAF wage shows that the estimates of the predicted wage are sensible: imputed wages are
similar to an existing, observed wage that is a lower bound on what could be achieved in the labor
market.
35Assuming that agricultural production exhibits diminishing marginal returns and that patrilineal and matrilineal
households can be described by the same production function, then the average agricultural product can be used
instead of the marginal agricultural product to compare this wedge across the two descent types. In this case the
wedge will be a lower bound on the true wedge.
36This is also true when comparing observed wages, which are higher for patrilineal than matrilineal men.
37The MASAF programme o¤ers a social safety net. It operates di¤erently to employment guarantee schemes
elsewhere, such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee of India, which sets wages above the market clearing
wage.
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Table 5: Consumption and labor supply in placebo group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Agricultural Wage Agric.-Wage Agric.+Wage Ln(exp)
Patrilineal 0.236 6.304 -6.068 6.540 -0.017
(1.796) (3.998) (4.535) (4.226) (0.134)
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y Y
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
Community controls Y Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 422 422 422 422 422
Number of community clusters 191 191 191 191 191
R2 0.419 0.497 0.509 0.456 0.637
Standard errors are clustered by community and reported in parentheses.  denotes signicance at 1% level,  at 5%
level and  at 10% level. These regressions exclude households who do not own any land. The geographical controls
are temperature, rainfall, greenness and soil quality, which are listed in Online Appendix D. The individual controls are
the natural log of the husbands predicted wage from a Heckman selection model (only in regressions (1) to (4)), acres
of land farmed, the heads age, age squared, education level and gender, the number of male children, female children,
male adults, female adults, male elderly and female elderly in the household, dummy variables measuring the month and
year of the interview, and the households distance to the nearest road. The community controls are a dummy variable
for the existence of a womens group, the presence of immigrants, the presence of wage or business labour opportunities,
and the proportion of households that farm maize, tobacco, groundnut, rice and mango. All regressions also include
dummy variables for the Southern and Central regions and the district-level divorce rate.
5.3 Placebo Group without Land Ownership
Next, I test whether the e¤ects of descent are present in a placebo group with no land ownership by
re-estimating the expenditure and labor supply regressions for this subsample (Table 5). The theory
predicts that the estimated di¤erences between patrilineal and matrilineal households are driven
by incentives to invest in land, so that no di¤erences should be observed between matrilineal and
patrilineal households that do not own land. This is indeed the case: among households who own
no land, there is no signicant di¤erence between patrilineal and matrilineal households in terms
of expenditure and labor allocation. The magnitudes of the coe¢ cients in regressions (1) and (2)
are close to zero, while the coe¢ cient in regression (3) is of the opposite sign to that observed in
the baseline regressions.
5.4 Robustness Checks
5.4.1 Alternative Specications
To check the robustness of the main results to alternative specications, I re-estimate all labor
supply equations using a Tobit model (Table 14 in Online Appendix A.4) and the e¤ect of descent
on the levels of each of the consumption categories in an OLS and Tobit model (Tables 15 and 16).
The results are rmly robust to these alternative models. Next, I estimate the e¤ect of descent on
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income in both an OLS regression and a Tobit model (Table 17).38 I nd that, consistent with the
predictions of the noncooperative model, the income gap between patrilineal and matrilineal house-
holds is MWK 31012 ($43:30), which is approximately 36% of average income and not inconsistent
with a 10% gap in consumption. I also estimate the e¤ect of descent on husbandswage earnings
(Table 17), where I nd that patrilineal husbands earn MWK 11875 ($16:40) less than matrilineal
husbands, which represents a 13:7% reduction in baseline income, due to husbandswage earnings.
This is surprisingly close to the estimated 10% gap in consumption. Note that average income is
far lower than average consumption, showing that income in this survey is underreported and hence
less reliable than consumption in measuring household welfare.
5.4.2 Controlling for Observables and Accounting for Unobservables
The empirical results could be driven by omitted variables that are correlated with descent, con-
sumption and labor supply. Online Appendix A.4 presents estimates of the main regression equa-
tions when controlling for additional observable variables. In particular, I consider further geo-
graphic measures such as GPS coordinates, plot-level soil quality and the exclusion of the Northern
region, a measure of colonial infuence (distance to the nearest colonial railway station), ethnic group
characteristics from the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock 1967), ethnic group xed e¤ects proxied by
language, and religion xed e¤ects (Tables 18-21).39 In all these additional checks, the coe¢ cient
estimates on patriliny are unchanged from the baseline regressions.40
Although the results are robust to controlling for observables, there may be further unobservable
factors that a¤ect selection into descent type and economic choices that, if observed, would explain
the results. To alleviate this concern, I adapt and implement the strategy proposed by Oster
(2016) and Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) to verify the robustness of the results to selection on
unobservables. In particular, the method uses information from movement in estimated coe¢ cients
and movement in R2 as controls are added to the regression to estimate the potential impact
of controlling for unobservables, if they were in fact observable (see Online Appendix C for a
detailed discussion). The results indicate that the coe¢ cient estimates are robust to even the most
conservative assumptions of selection on unobservables: selection on unobservables would have to
be almost eleven times as strong as selection on observables to explain the e¤ect of patriliny on
wage labor hours, and almost four times as strong to explain the e¤ect of patriliny on expenditure.
Unobservables would have to be negatively correlated with observables to explain the estimated
e¤ect of patriliny on agricultural labor hours.
38Both income and wages are deated by the same price index used to deate the consumption aggregates. The
construction of the income aggregate follows Hoddinott and Haddad (1995): it includes salaries, income from crop
sales, prot from business and remittances from children and others.
39For the colonial railway stations, I use the station list on http://www.cear.mw and exclude stations built after
Malawi achieved independent rule. I calculate the distance to the closest railway station for each village. The list of
stations and their GPS coordinates are in Appendix E.
40Another alternative explanation is that more able patrilineal men migrate to matrilineal areas. However, mar-
riages between matrilineal and patrilineal individuals appear rare - in the LSMS, village headmen were asked about
the types of marriages observed in their village, where a mixed marriage was not listed as an option.
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6 Alternative Mechanisms
The estimated negative e¤ect of patriliny on consumption and wage hours, and positive e¤ect
on agricultural hours, is inconsistent with a fully e¢ cient collective model, but consistent with an
extension to the collective model in which there is limited commitment and noncooperative decision
making in labor supply choices. In this Section, I show that alternative mechanisms cannot explain
the main results. First, I focus on the alternative mechanisms modelled in Section 3.2 that predict
a similar labor supply and output pattern to noncooperative decision making: a market failure
via transaction costs in the wage labor market, and tenure insecurity and fallowing constraints.
Second, I consider whether descent could be capturing rules other than land inheritance, such as
marital residence, social norms about work, or political succession.
6.1 Transaction Costs in the Wage Labor Market
A potential alternative explanation for the nding that patrilineal husbands spend more time on
agricultural labor and less time on wage labor is that there are transaction costs in the wage
labor market, which a¤ect patrilineal households more than matrilineal households. The presence
of these transaction costs would also predict lower overall income and consumption in patrilineal
households.
I test whether the availability of wage labor locally varies between patrilineal and matrilineal
communities (Columns 1-3, Table 6). There is no di¤erence in whether there is any wage employ-
ment in the village, and whether the public works program MASAF is present in the community.
However, patrilineal households are 2.9 percentage points more likely to migrate looking for work,
suggesting that there may be better employment opportunities elsewhere. Travelling to these lo-
cations may be costly. I compare the cost of travelling to employment opportunities between
patrilineal and matrilineal households (Columns 4-10, Table 6). There is evidence that costs are
higher for patrilineal households: the distance to the nearest government o¢ ce (boma) and urban
centre are signicantly higher for patrilineal communities (9:1 and 35:6 kilometres respectively),
and the fare is on average higher. There is no signicant di¤erence in the distance to the nearest
bus stop, market, post o¢ ce or telephone. This suggests that patrilineal households are further
away from major amenities, but not any further away from minor amenities.
In order to assess whether these di¤erences in labor costs can explain the labor allocation and
consumption gap between patrilineal and matrilineal households, I control for the three measures
of costs that are signicantly di¤erent between patrilineal and matrilineal households in the main
regressions: bus fare, distance to government o¢ ce and distance to urban centre (regressions (1)-(3),
(4)-(6) and (7)-(9) respectively, in Table 7). Some interesting patterns emerge. A higher bus fare
and longer distance to a government o¢ ce do predict lower wage labor, higher agricultural labor
and lower expenditure, in a similar pattern to patriliny itself and consistent with the predictions
of the model in Section 3.2. However, the presence of these transaction costs cannot explain the
impact of patriliny on labor allocation and expenditure.
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Further, the magnitude of the e¤ect of these costs is smaller than the e¤ect of patriliny. For
example, Table 6 shows that the average di¤erence in fare between patrilineal and matrilineal
households is MWK 90:7. Multiplying this by the coe¢ cients on bus fare in Table 7 predicts that
patrilineal husbands spend 11 more minutes on agricultural work and 5:5 fewer minutes on wage
work per week on average due to the di¤erence in bus fare. The predicted gap in consumption
is 0:9%. To the extent that these measures of wage labor transaction costs accurately capture
the costs faced by these households - which seems likely given their signicant impact on labor
allocation that is consistent with theory - the evidence suggests that while patrilineal households
do face higher wage labor market transaction costs, the magnitude of the estimated e¤ect is much
smaller than the estimated e¤ect of patriliny, which is robust to controlling for these measures of
labor market transaction costs.
6.2 Tenure Insecurity, Fallowing and Dynamic Investment Incentives
An alternative explanation for the ndings in Section 5 is that patrilineal households face tenure
insecurity, which forces them to overinvest in their agricultural land in order to retain rights over its
use (as in, for example, Udry and Goldstein 2008). This tenure insecurity could plausibly lower their
prot and therefore overall expenditure. Similarly, if fallowing is optimal but patrilineal households
face constraints to fallowing, then they may engage in more agricultural labor and generate less
output. There is no evidence of di¤erences in tenure insecurity and fallowing between patrilineal
and matrilineal households (Table 8). In particular, there is no estimated di¤erence in the share of
land that is insecure (dened as not inherited or not purchased with a title), the share of land that
was left fallow in the last agricultural season, and no di¤erence in behavior that could plausibly
a¤ect tenure security, such as the application of fertilizer, and planting with permanent crops.
Matrilineal households could have higher discount factors than patrilineal households, and so
spend more today at the expense of saving for tomorrow, while allocating their time towards more
immediate income-earning work, such as wage work. Column (6) in Table 8 shows that patrilineal
households own signicantly fewer livestock, a plausible measure of savings. Matrilineal household
heads are also 8% more likely to say they are able to use their income to build their savings, and
this di¤erence is statistically signicant at the 1% level. Thus, di¤erences in discount factors are
unlikely to explain the results.
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Table 7: Controlling for wage labor transaction costs in the main estimates
Agricultural Wage Ln(exp)
(1) (2) (3)
Patrilineal 1.291 -1.305 -0.093
(0.682) (0.825) (0.031)
Fare to boma 0.002 -0.001 -0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Number of observations 7190 7190 7190
Number of community clusters 628 628 628
R2 0.179 0.184 0.371
(4) (5) (6)
Patrilineal 1.230 -1.290 -0.094
(0.674) (0.825) (0.031)
Distance to boma 0.024 -0.010 -0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.000)
Number of observations 7191 7191 7191
Number of community clusters 628 628 628
R2 0.178 0.184 0.371
(7) (8) (9)
Patrilineal 1.460 -1.407 -0.095
(0.689) (0.849) (0.032)
Distance to urban centre -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.0001)
Number of observations 7190 7190 7190
Number of community clusters 628 628 628
R2 0.177 0.184 0.371
Geographical controls Y Y Y
Individual controls Y Y Y
Community controls Y Y Y
Standard errors are clustered by community and reported in parentheses.  denotes sig-
nicance at 1% level,  at 5% level and  at 10% level. This table reports the value of the
coe¢ cient on the variables Patrilineal, bus fare to the nearest government centre (boma),
distance (km) to the nearest government centre (boma) and distance (km) to the nearest
urban centre in regressions where the dependent variables are weekly hours of agricultural
work (column 1), weekly hours of wage work (column 2) and log of household expenditure
(column 3). The geographical controls are temperature, rainfall, greenness and soil quality,
which are listed in Online Appendix D. The individual controls are the natural log of the
husbands predicted wage form a Heckman selection model (in columns 1 and 2 only), acres
of land farmed, the heads age, age squared, education level and gender, the number of
male children, female children, male adults, female adults, male elderly and female elderly
in the household, dummy variables measuring the month and year of the interview, and the
households distance to the nearest road. The community controls are a dummy variable
for the existence of a womens group, the presence of immigrants, the presence of wage or
business labour opportunities, and the proportion of households that farm maize, tobacco,
groundnut, rice and mango. All regressions also include dummy variables for the Southern
and Central regions and the district-level divorce rate.
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6.3 Rules of Descent
In this Section, I consider whether descent could be capturing rules other than land inheritance:
marital residence, social norms or political succession.
6.3.1 Marital Residence
Kinship groups in Malawi have distinct patterns of marital residence, which are correlated with
descent. In particular, patrilineal households tend to be patrilocal (where the wife moves to the
husbands village after marriage), while matrilineal households tend to be matrilocal (where the
husband moves to the wifes village). While acknowledging that marital residence is a choice,
and hence endogenous to labor and expenditure outcomes, I explore the role of marital residence
by controlling for whether a household is patrilocal or not in the main regressions (Table 9).
Interestingly, patrilocality has a similar impact on mens labor allocation to patriliny, although the
estimated e¤ect is smaller. However, there is no correlation with total expenditure - suggesting
that patrilocal households do not face additional constraints that would make them less e¢ cient,
as compared to matrilocal or neolocal households. The estimated e¤ect of patriliny on expenditure
and labor allocation is unchanged in these regressions.
6.3.2 Succession to Political O¢ ce
Adams (1999) argues that in addition to determining property inheritance, descent also determines
succession to political o¢ ce. To consider this mechanism, I exclude any household with a village
headman and estimate the e¤ect of descent on consumption and agricultural and work hours. The
coe¢ cients on patriliny in regressions (4)-(6) in Table 9 are similar to those estimated in the baseline
regressions. To consider government roles more widely, I exclude all households with a member
who works for the government (regressions (1)-(3) in Table 22, Online Appendix A.5), resulting in
no signicant change to the magnitudes of the main coe¢ cients.
6.3.3 Social Norms
There may be social norms that have evolved so that patrilineal men are expected to specialize in
agriculture. The strength of these social norms is likely to be increasing in the share of patrilineal
households in the community. An indicative way of testing this hypothesis is to compare patrilineal
households with households in mixed villages that are both patrilineal and matrilineal. Households
in mixed villages should behave like an attenuated version of patrilineal households - with weaker
enforcement of the social norm. Regressions (4)-(6) in Table 22, Online Appendix A.5, display the
main results from Table 2 and also the coe¢ cient on the dummy variable for households in mixed
villages, which is a control variable in all regressions. Households in mixed villages do not appear
to be signicantly di¤erent from patrilineal households in terms of wage labor hours, but engage in
signicantly lower agricultural hours (p < 0:05). This pattern is not consistent with the idea that
patrilineal villages are a version of mixed villages with more enforced social norms.
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Table 9: Controlling for marital residence and accounting for succession to political o¢ ce
HHs without village headman
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agric. Wage Ln(exp) Agric. Wage Ln(exp)
Patrilineal 1.463 -1.396 -0.099 1.484 -1.387 -0.098
(0.678) (0.830) (0.031) (0.685) (0.827) (0.031)
Patrilocal 0.776 -0.794 0.009
(0.463) (0.403) (0.020)
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Community controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 7203 7203 7203 7178 7178 7178
Number of community clusters 628 628 628 628 628 628
R2 0.178 0.184 0.370 0.178 0.186 0.371
Standard errors are clustered by community and reported in parentheses.  denotes signicance at 1% level,  at
5% level and  at 10% level. This table reports the value of the coe¢ cient on the variables Patrilineal and Patrilocal
(dened as the husband living in his birth village and the wife reporting that she moved to this village for marriage), in
regressions where the dependent variables are weekly hours of agricultural work (column 1), weekly hours of wage work
(column 2) and log of household expenditure (column 3). Columns (4)-(6) do not include households that report have
a village headman in the family. The geographical controls are temperature, rainfall, greenness and soil quality, which
are listed in Online Appendix D. The individual controls are the natural log of the husbands predicted wage from a
Heckman selection model (only in regressions (1), (2), (4) and (5)), acres of land farmed, the heads age, age squared,
education level and gender, the number of male children, female children, male adults, female adults, male elderly and
female elderly in the household, dummy variables measuring the month and year of the interview, and the households
distance to the nearest road. The community controls are a dummy variable for the existence of a womens group, the
presence of immigrants, the presence of wage or business labour opportunities, and the proportion of households that
farm maize, tobacco, groundnut, rice and mango. All regressions also include dummy variables for the Southern and
Central regions and the district-level divorce rate.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, I propose and implement a new test of production e¢ ciency in the household, that
also tests whether ine¢ ciency is driven by limited commitment. I extend the collective model
to allow a noncooperative rst stage, which results from limited commitment in labor allocation.
Labor supply a¤ects future bargaining power because it determines the value of future outside
options. The model predicts that individuals spend more time on the type of labor that most
improves their outside option. This results in lower overall consumption available for sharing in
the second period.
I test for production e¢ ciency in the household by exploiting predetermined variation in descent
in Malawi, which governs land rights. I nd that patrilineal men spend more time on agricultural
labor, less time on wage labor and generate less consumption overall, compared to matrilineal men.
The outside options of patrilineal men are increasing in the value of their land, so this nding is
consistent with the limited commitment collective model, where individuals invest in their outside
options to raise future bargaining power. The empirical results are robust to a wide variety of
checks, and are not explained by alternative mechanisms such as wage labor transaction costs,
dynamic investment choices or tenure insecurity.
The results in this paper suggest that there may be ine¢ ciencies in how resources are allocated
across time within households. This relates to the literature on limited commitment and dynamic
models of the household, with growing evidence that e¢ ciency is more di¢ cult to achieve in dynamic
than static settings (Chiappori and Mazzocco 2017, Mazzocco 2007, Robinson 2012, Dubois and
Ligon 2011).
This paper rejects production e¢ ciency in the context of the collective model, and so is coherent
with similar results in other papers, mostly in developing countries. As consumption e¢ ciency is
often not rejected in the literature, this suggests that there may be more serious constraints to
achieving production e¢ ciency, and that these two measures of e¢ ciency should be considered
separately, as in Rangel and Thomas (2012). More generally, the ndings demonstrate that the
size of the household piemay not be invariant to spousesoutside options, and noncooperative
decisions can have a negative impact on household welfare.
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A Additional results tables
A.1 Control of crop sales
Table 10: Control of plots and crop sales by spouses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# Plots controlled by: Value of crop sales controlled by:
Woman Man Woman Man
Patrilineal -0.006 0.059 -142.717 2299.801
(0.010) (0.022) (67.030) (1187.322)
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y
Individual controls Y Y Y Y
Community controls Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 7203 7203 7203 7203
Number of community clusters 628 628 628 628
R2 0.034 0.091 0.021 0.056
Standard errors are clustered by community and reported in parentheses.  denotes signicance at 1% level,  at
5% level and  at 10% level. This table reports the value of the coe¢ cient on the variable Patrilineal in regressions
where the dependent variables are the number of plots controlled only by the wife or by the husband (columns 1 and
2 respectively) and the total value of crop sales controlled only by the wife or husband (columns 3 and 4 respectively).
The geographical controls are temperature, rainfall, greenness and soil quality, which are listed in Appendix D. The
individual controls are the acres of land farmed, the heads age, age squared, education level and gender, the number
of male children, female children, male adults, female adults, male elderly and female elderly in the household,
dummy variables measuring the month and year of the interview, and the households distance to the nearest road.
The community controls are a dummy variable for the existence of a womens group, the presence of immigrants,
the presence of wage or business labour opportunities, and the proportion of households that farm maize, tobacco,
groundnut, rice and mango. All regressions also include dummy variables for the Southern and Central regions and
the district-level divorce rate.
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A.2 Crop choices
Table 11: The estimated e¤ect of descent on main crop choice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Main crop is:
Maize Tobacco Groundnut Rice Other
Patrilineal -0.010 -0.027 -0.011 0.008 0.009
(0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.005) (0.028)
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y Y
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
Community controls Y Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 7203 7203 7203 7203 7203
Number of community clusters 628 628 628 628 628
R2 0.186 0.372 0.219 0.372 0.225
Standard errors are clustered by community and reported in parentheses.  denotes signicance at 1% level,  at
5% level and  at 10% level. This table reports the value of the coe¢ cient on the variable Patrilineal in regressions
where the dependent variables are indicator variables for whether maize, tobacco, groundnut, rice, or another crop
are the households main crop, dened as covering the largest planted area of all crops that the household grows.
The geographical controls are temperature, rainfall, greenness and soil quality, which are listed in Appendix D. The
individual controls are the acres of land farmed, the heads age, age squared, education level and gender, the number
of male children, female children, male adults, female adults, male elderly and female elderly in the household,
dummy variables measuring the month and year of the interview, and the households distance to the nearest road.
The community controls are a dummy variable for the existence of a womens group, the presence of immigrants,
the presence of wage or business labour opportunities, and the proportion of households that farm maize, tobacco,
groundnut, rice and mango. All regressions also include dummy variables for the Southern and Central regions and
the district-level divorce rate.
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A.3 Sensitivity to controls
Table 12: Sensitivity to controls: Labor supply
Estimated coe¢ cient on Patrilineal (1) (2) (3)
1. Agricultural 0.937 1.449 1.453
(0.620) (0.698) (0.682)
2. Wage -1.594 -1.400 -1.386
(0.572) (0.829) (0.831)
3. Wage - Agric. 2.532 2.849 2.840
(0.927) (1.147) (1.141)
4. Wage + Agric. -0.657 0.049 0.067
(0.749) (1.016) (1.005)
Basic controls Y Y Y
Geographical controls N Y Y
Community controls N Y Y
Household controls N N Y
Predicted wage Y Y N
Number of observations 7203 7203 7203
Number of community clusters 628 628 628
Standard errors are clustered by community and reported in parentheses.  denotes signicance at 1% level,  at
5% level and  at 10% level. This table reports the value of the coe¢ cient on the variable Patrilineal in regressions
where the dependent variables are husbandsagricultural labour (row 1), wage labour (row 2), the di¤erence between
wage and agricultural labour (row 3) and the sum of wage and agricultural labour (row 4). The basic controls are
the household heads age, age squared, education level, log predicted wage from the Heckman model, and dummy
variables for the interview month and year. Column (2) adds a dummy variable for the existence of a womens group,
the presence of immigrants, the presence of wage or business labour opportunities, the district-level divorce rate, the
distance to the nearest road and the proportion of households that farm maize, tobacco, groundnut, rice and mango,
and geographical controls, including temperature, rainfall, greenness and soil quality, which are listed in Appendix
D, as well as dummy variables for the Southern and Central regions. Column (3) drops the predicted wage, and adds
household composition, amount of land owned, and the gender of the household head.
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Table 13: Sensitivity to controls: Consumption
(1) (2)
Ln (real expenditure)
Patrilineal -0.141 -0.095
(0.033) (0.033)
Basic controls Y Y
Geographical controls N Y
Community controls N Y
Household controls N N
Number of observations 7203 7203
Number of community clusters 628 628
R2 0.145 0.274
Standard errors are clustered by community and reported in parentheses.  de-
notes signicance at 1% level,  at 5% level and  at 10% level. The basic controls
are the household heads age, age squared, education level, and dummy variables for
the interview month and year. Column (2) adds a dummy variable for the existence
of a womens group, the presence of immigrants, the presence of wage or business
labour opportunities, the district-level divorce rate, the distance to the nearest road
and the proportion of households that farm maize, tobacco, groundnut, rice and
mango, and geographical controls, including temperature, rainfall, greenness and
soil quality, which are listed in Appendix D, as well as dummy variables for the
Southern and Central regions.
A.4 Robustness checks
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Table 14: Tobit model of labor supply
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Agricultural Wage Agric. - Wage Agric. + Wage
Patrilineal -0.054 1.529 -0.489 1.826 -0.077
(0.967) (0.526) (0.477) (0.734) (0.897)
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y Y
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
Community controls Y Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 7203 7203 7203 7203 7203
Number of community clusters 628 628 628 628 628
This table reports the marginal e¤ects at means from a Tobit model. Standard errors are clustered by community
and reported in parentheses.  denotes signicance at 1% level,  at 5% level and  at 10% level. The geographical
controls are temperature, rainfall, greenness and soil quality, which are listed in Appendix D. The individual controls
are the natural log of the husbands predicted wage from a Heckman selection model, acres of land farmed, the heads
age, age squared, education level and gender, the number of male children, female children, male adults, female
adults, male elderly and female elderly in the household, dummy variables measuring the month and year of the
interview, and the households distance to the nearest road. The community controls are a dummy variable for the
existence of a womens group, the presence of immigrants, the presence of wage or business labour opportunities,
and the proportion of households that farm maize, tobacco, groundnut, rice and mango. All regressions also include
dummy variables for the Southern and Central regions and the district-level divorce rate.
Table 15: Consumption in levels (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp. Pc exp. Equiv.
exp.
Purchases Public
exp.
Private
exp.
Patrilineal -24.653 -4.669 -4.921 -26.909 -9.777 -14.875
(9.326) (1.893) (2.110) (8.881) (3.635) (6.530)
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Community controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of community clusters 628 628 628 628 628 628
Number of observations 7203 7203 7203 7203 7203 7203
R2 0.318 0.310 0.304 0.286 0.239 0.296
Standard errors are clustered by community and reported in parentheses.  denotes signicance at 1% level,  at 5%
level and  at 10% level. The dependent variables are measured in local currency (000s Malawi Kwacha). The geographical
controls are temperature, rainfall, greenness and soil quality, which are listed in Appendix D. The individual controls are the
acres of land farmed, the heads age, age squared, education level and gender, the number of male children, female children,
male adults, female adults, male elderly and female elderly in the household, dummy variables measuring the month and
year of the interview, and the households distance to the nearest road. The community controls are a dummy variable for
the existence of a womens group, the presence of immigrants, the presence of wage or business labour opportunities, and
the proportion of households that farm maize, tobacco, groundnut, rice and mango. All regressions also include dummy
variables for the Southern and Central regions and the district-level divorce rate.
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Table 16: Consumption in levels (Tobit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp. Pc exp. Equiv.
exp.
Purchases Public
exp.
Private
exp.
Patrilineal -22.703 -4.361 -4.632 -22.985 -7.734 -13.849
(8.439) (1.752) (1.970) (7.356) (2.780) (6.042)
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Community controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of community clusters 628 628 628 628 628 628
Number of observations 7203 7203 7203 7203 7203 7203
This table reports marginal e¤ects at means from a Tobit model. Standard errors are clustered by community and reported
in parentheses.  denotes signicance at 1% level,  at 5% level and  at 10% level. The dependent variables are measured
in local currency (000s Malawi Kwacha). The geographical controls are temperature, rainfall, greenness and soil quality,
which are listed in Appendix D. The individual controls are the acres of land farmed, the heads age, age squared, education
level and gender, the number of male children, female children, male adults, female adults, male elderly and female elderly in
the household, dummy variables measuring the month and year of the interview, and the households distance to the nearest
road. The community controls are a dummy variable for the existence of a womens group, the presence of immigrants, the
presence of wage or business labour opportunities, and the proportion of households that farm maize, tobacco, groundnut,
rice and mango. All regressions also include dummy variables for the Southern and Central regions and the district-level
divorce rate.
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Table 17: Income and husbands earnings in levels
OLS Tobit model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income Husbands
earnings
Income Husbands
earnings
Patrilineal -31.012 -11.875 -18.325 -4.204
(12.648) (4.038) (7.598) (2.394)
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y
Individual controls Y Y Y Y
Community controls Y Y Y Y
Number of community clusters 628 628 628 628
Number of observations 7203 7203 7203 7203
R2 0.146 0.341 N/A N/A
Standard errors are clustered by community and reported in parentheses.  denotes signicance at 1% level,  at 5%
level and  at 10% level. The dependent variables are measured in local currency (000s Malawi Kwacha). Regressions
(1) and (2) estimate Ordinary Least Squares, while regressions (3) and (4) report the marginal e¤ects at means of
a Tobit model. The geographical controls are temperature, rainfall, greenness and soil quality, which are listed in
Appendix D. The individual controls are the acres of land farmed, the heads age, age squared, education level and
gender, the number of male children, female children, male adults, female adults, male elderly and female elderly in
the household, dummy variables measuring the month and year of the interview, and the households distance to the
nearest road. The community controls are a dummy variable for the existence of a womens group, the presence of
immigrants, the presence of wage or business labour opportunities, and the proportion of households that farm maize,
tobacco, groundnut, rice and mango. All regressions also include dummy variables for the Southern and Central regions
and the district-level divorce rate.
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Table 18: Controlling for observables in labor supply regressions
Estimated coe¢ cient on Patrilineal (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Agricultural 1.560 1.183 1.457 1.473 1.457
(0.701) (0.706) (0.692) (0.679) (0.687)
2. Wage -1.529 -1.179 -1.535 -1.394 -1.342
(0.874) (0.814) (0.883) (0.830) (0.839)
3. Wage - Agric. 3.089 2.362 2.992 2.867 2.799
(1.195) (1.160) (1.201) (1.136) (1.153)
4. Wage + Agric. 0.030 0.004 -0.077 0.079 0.115
(1.040) (0.988) (1.037) (1.005) (1.011)
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y Y
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
Community controls Y Y Y Y Y
GPS Y N N N N
Plot quality N Y N N N
Railway distance N N N Y N
Tribes N N N N Y
Number of observations 7203 6781 5882 7203 7203
Number of community clusters 628 624 518 579 628
Standard errors are clustered by community and reported in parentheses.  denotes signicance at 1% level,  at
5% level and  at 10% level. This table reports the value of the coe¢ cient on the variable Patrilineal in regressions
where the dependent variables are husbandsagricultural labour (row 1), wage labour (row 2), the di¤erence between
wage and agricultural labour (row 3) and the sum of wage and agricultural labour (row 4). Compared to the baseline
regressions in Table 2, regression (1) adds GPS co-ordinates, (2) adds plot quality, plot erosion and plot slope, (3)
restricts the sample to the Southern and Central regions, (4) adds distance to nearest colonial railway station, and
(5) adds language dummy variables. (2) has a reduced sample size due to missing plot quality or colonial information
for some households. The geographical controls are temperature, rainfall, greenness and soil quality, which are listed
in Online Appendix D. The individual controls are the natural log of the husbands predicted wage form a Heckman
selection model, acres of land farmed, the heads age, age squared, education level and gender, the number of male
children, female children, male adults, female adults, male elderly and female elderly in the household, dummy variables
measuring the month and year of the interview, and the households distance to the nearest road. The community
controls are a dummy variable for the existence of a womens group, the presence of immigrants, the presence of wage or
business labour opportunities, and the proportion of households that farm maize, tobacco, groundnut, rice and mango.
All regressions also include dummy variables for the Southern and Central regions and the district-level divorce rate.
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Table 19: Controlling for observables in the consumption regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln(expenditure)
Patrilineal -0.098 -0.092 -0.088 -0.100 -0.094
(0.032) (0.030) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031)
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y Y
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
Community controls Y Y Y Y Y
GPS Y N N N N
Plot quality N Y N N N
Railway distance N N N Y N
Tribes N N N N Y
Number of observations 7203 6781 5882 7203 7203
Number of community clusters 628 624 518 579 628
R2 0.374 0.368 0.366 0.371 0.373
Standard errors are clustered by community and reported in parentheses.  denotes signicance at 1% level,  at
5% level and  at 10% level. Compared to the baseline regression (1) in Table 3, regression (1) adds GPS co-ordinates,
(2) adds plot quality, plot erosion and plot slope, (3) restricts the sample to the Southern and Central regions, (4) adds
distance to nearest colonial railway station, and (5) adds language dummy variables. (2) has a reduced sample size
due to missing plot quality or colonial information for some households. The geographical controls are temperature,
rainfall, greenness and soil quality, which are listed in Online Appendix D. The individual controls are the acres of
land farmed, the heads age, age squared, education level and gender, the number of male children, female children,
male adults, female adults, male elderly and female elderly in the household, dummy variables measuring the month
and year of the interview, and the households distance to the nearest road. The community controls are a dummy
variable for the existence of a womens group, the presence of immigrants, the presence of wage or business labour
opportunities, and the proportion of households that farm maize, tobacco, groundnut, rice and mango. All regressions
also include dummy variables for the Southern and Central regions and the district-level divorce rate.
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Table 20: Controlling for observables: Labor supply
Estimated coe¢ cient on Patrilineal (1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Agricultural 1.176 1.796 1.726 1.724
(0.707) (0.780) (0.762) (0.676)
2. Wage -1.072 -1.386 -1.374 -1.453
(0.808) (0.831) (0.832) (0.822)
3. Wage - Agric. 2.248 3.182 3.100 3.177
(1.159) (1.242) (1.225) (1.119)
4. Wage + Agric. 0.104 0.410 0.353 0.271
(0.981) (1.026) (1.022) (1.007)
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y
Community controls Y Y Y Y
Individual controls Y Y Y Y
Number of community clusters 624 607 607 628
Number of observations 6781 5946 5946 7203
Standard errors are clustered by community and reported in parentheses.  denotes signicance at 1% level,  at
5% level and  at 10% level. This table reports the value of the coe¢ cient on the variable Patrilineal in regressions
where the dependent variables are husbandsagricultural labour (row 1), wage labour (row 2), the di¤erence between
wage and agricultural labour (row 3) and the sum of wage and agricultural labour (row 4). Regression (1) repeats
the estimation equations in Appendix D for the subsample with information on plot quality. Using dummy variables,
regression (2) controls for the major crop type (v29) and predominant form of animal husbandry (v40) from the
Murdoch atlas. Regression (3) controls for the class structure (v66) and marital structure (v9) from the Murdoch atlas.
Regression (4) controls for the predominant religion practised in the village. The geographical controls are temperature,
rainfall, greenness and soil quality, which are listed in Table 23. The individual controls are the log of the husbands
predicted wage from a Heckman selection model, acres of land farmed, the heads age, age squared, education level
and gender, the number of male children, female children, male adults, female adults, male elderly and female elderly
in the household, dummy variables measuring the month and year of the interview, and the households distance to
the nearest road. The community controls are a dummy variable for the existence of a womens group, the presence of
immigrants, the presence of wage or business labour opportunities, and the proportion of households that farm maize,
tobacco, groundnut, rice and mango. All regressions also include dummy variables for the Southern and Central regions
and the district-level divorce rate.
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Table 21: Controlling for observables: Consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln (real expenditure)
Patrilineal -0.081 -0.089 -0.090 -0.107
(0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032)
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y
Individual controls Y Y Y Y
Community controls Y Y Y Y
Number of community clusters 624 607 607 628
Number of observations 6781 5946 5946 7203
R2 0.364 0.355 0.355 0.372
Standard errors are clustered by community and reported in parentheses.  denotes signicance at 1% level, 
at 5% level and  at 10% level. Regression (1) repeats the estimation equation (1) in Table 3 for the subsample
with information on plot quality. Using dummy variables, regression (2) controls for the major crop type (v29)
and predominant form of animal husbandry (v40) from the Murdoch atlas. Regression (3) controls for the class
structure (v66) and marital structure (v9) from the Murdoch atlas. Regression (4) controls for the predominant
religion practised in the village. The geographical controls are temperature, rainfall, greenness and soil quality, which
are listed in Appendix D. The individual controls are the acres of land farmed, the heads age, age squared, education
level and gender, the number of male children, female children, male adults, female adults, male elderly and female
elderly in the household, dummy variables measuring the month and year of the interview, and the households
distance to the nearest road. The community controls are a dummy variable for the existence of a womens group,
the presence of immigrants, the presence of wage or business labour opportunities, and the proportion of households
that farm maize, tobacco, groundnut, rice and mango. All regressions also include dummy variables for the Southern
and Central regions and the district-level divorce rate.
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A.5 Alternative mechanisms
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Table 22: Controlling for succession to political o¢ ce
HHs without government workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agric. Wage Ln(exp) Agric. Wage Ln(exp)
Patrilineal 1.451 -1.317 -0.100 1.453 -1.386 -0.099
(0.683) (0.814) (0.032) (0.682) (0.831) (0.031)
Mixed lineage -1.056 -1.225 -0.027
(0.901) (1.226) (0.072)
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Community controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of observations 7136 7136 7136 7203 7203 7203
Number of community clusters 628 628 628 628 628 628
R2 0.177 0.185 0.367 0.177 0.184 0.370
Standard errors are clustered by community and reported in parentheses.  denotes signicance at 1% level, 
at 5% level and  at 10% level. This table reports the value of the coe¢ cient on the variables Patrilineal and Mixed
lineage (villages that have both patrilineal and matrilineal households), in regressions where the dependent variables are
weekly hours of agricultural work (column 1), weekly hours of wage work (column 2) and log of household expenditure
(column 3). Columns (4)-(6) do not include households that report have any government workers in the family. The
geographical controls are temperature, rainfall, greenness and soil quality, which are listed in Online Appendix D.
The individual controls are the natural log of the husbands predicted wage from a Heckman selection model (only in
regressions (1), (2), (4) and (5)), acres of land farmed, the heads age, age squared, education level and gender, the
number of male children, female children, male adults, female adults, male elderly and female elderly in the household,
dummy variables measuring the month and year of the interview, and the households distance to the nearest road.
The community controls are a dummy variable for the existence of a womens group, the presence of immigrants,
the presence of wage or business labour opportunities, and the proportion of households that farm maize, tobacco,
groundnut, rice and mango. All regressions also include dummy variables for the Southern and Central regions and
the district-level divorce rate.
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B Dynamic investment incentives
Let us assume two periods, where household member i has lifetime utility U(xi0; x
i
1): for example,
U(xi0; x
i
1) = u(x
i
0) + u(x
i
1), where x
i
t is i
0s consumption in period t.
With access to nancial markets with an interest rate of r, we solve a standard (collective)
intertemporal consumption problem, maximizing utility subject to a lifetime budget constraint
where bargaining power does not change over time:
max(z)Ua(xa0; x
a
1) + U
b(xb0; x
b
1)
subject to X
t
1
(1 + r)t

pt 
X
xit


X
t
1
(1 + r)t
(wt  nt + qtAtF (ht)) ;
hit + n
i
t = 1;8i; t:
To model the feedback between agricultural labor today and productivity tomorrow, assume
that
A1 = A0 +   h0: (12)
In this case, period 0 labor h0 plays a dual role: it is productive at date 0, and is also an
investment in future productivity. The strength of this e¤ect on productivity is captured by . As
complete markets apply, the household rm maximizes the present value of prots:
max
h0;h1
 =
X
t
1
(1 + r)t
(qtAtF (ht)  wt  ht)
subject to (12). The rst-order conditions are
q0A0
dF (h0)
dh0
+ 
1
1 + r
q1F (h1) = w0; (13)
q1A1
dF (h1)
dh1
= w1:
Therefore, the e¤ective household shadow price of wage labor early in life is
w^0 = w0    1
1 + r
q1F (h1) < w0:
Households with high  will supply more agricultural labor in early life and less wage labor. As
a high  raises the (maximized) present value of the rms prots, then these households will also
have higher lifetime income.
Imperfect nancial markets
The above example is solved with the existence of nancial markets that allow consumption
smoothing over the lifecycle. Let us now sketch the case without nancial markets, where agricul-
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tural labor in the rst period, h0; raises future productivity, A1. The incentive to invest in land
early on clearly remains, but now this could come at the cost of reduced early consumption if the
household cannot borrow to smooth consumption over the lifecycle. However, overall, the option
to increase future productivity via agricultural labor must increase the households (discounted)
lifetime income, and therefore its (discounted) lifetime consumption. Thus, average consumption
over the lifecycle is still higher, even if it cannot be smoothed. When analyzing the consumption of
a cross-section of young and old households, empirically, this model does not predict lower average
consumption in the sample, unless the sample contains more young than old households. In partic-
ular, in order to generate the same predictions as the noncooperative model, the patrilineal sample
would need to be on average younger than the matrilineal sample. However, the main ndings
are estimated on a cross-section of households of all ages. The average age of the household head
in the sample is not signicantly diferent between patrilineal and matrilineal households, and the
standard deviation is also similar. This means that any di¤erences between early life and late life
consumption driven by dynamic investment choices should be balanced in the sample, yielding no
e¤ect on average consumption (contrary to the main ndings).
C Robustness to selection on unobservables
I adapt and implement the strategy proposed by Oster (2016) and Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005)
to verify the robustness of the results to selection on unobservables. The method proceeds in three
steps:
1. Record the impact of controlling for observable variables on the coe¢ cient of interest. I use
the coe¢ cients in Tables 2 and 3. Also required is a regression with a sparse set of individual
controls that are hypothesised not to be related to unobservables; I estimate regressions with
dummy variables for patriliny, mixed community, the age, age squared and education level of
the household head.
2. Quantify selection on unobservables. In the simple case with dependent variable y, one ob-
servable control multiplied by its true coe¢ cient X and a linear combination of unobservable
controls multiplied by their true coe¢ cients captured by vector Z, we write
 =
Cov(y; Z)
V ar(Z)
=
Cov(y;X)
V ar(X)
:
Intuitively, the bias introduced by omitting unobservables is  times the bias introduced by
omitting observables; the former is measured in step 1. In practice, I implement Osters
general estimator for multiple observable controls (see Oster 2016). To quantify selection, I
nd the coe¢ cient of proportionality  that would produce a coe¢ cient of zero on patriliny.
3. Construct set estimates for the coe¢ cient of interest that are robust to selection: assuming
that the R2 in a regression with all unobservables could be at most Rmax, the coe¢ cient is
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bounded on one side by the estimate with observable controls, and on the other side by a
bias-adjusted e¤ect that assumes  = 1:
I carry out these steps for the regressions on log household expenditure and husbands labor
supply.41 Figures 3, 4 and 5 plot the set estimates of the coe¢ cient on patriliny for the regressions
on husbands agricultural hours, husbands wage hours, and log household expenditure, respectively,
as a function of Rmax. Oster (2016) argues that assuming Rmax < 1 is usually justied, e.g. due
to measurement error, and suggests that as a rule of thumb, Rmax = 1:3 R2full, where R2full is the
achieved R2 in the regression with observable controls (as in Tables 2 and 3).
The results indicate that the coe¢ cient estimates are robust. Figure 3 shows that, for the
e¤ect of patriliny on agricultural hours, the identied coe¢ cient set moves away from zero as Rmax
increases. This is because the addition of controls moves the coe¢ cient on patriliny away from
zero, as seen in Table 12. The identied coe¢ cient set at Rmax = 1:3 R2full is [1:453; 1:790], or an
increase of 12:5  15:4% compared to baseline. The identied set for the coe¢ cient on patriliny in
the wage regression does not include zero until Rmax exceeds 0:85, and the estimated bounds on
patriliny in the wage regression with Rmax = 1:3 R2full are [ 1:385; 1:270], implying a reduction
of 24:1   26:5% in the wage hours of patrilineal husbands. The set estimate of the coe¢ cient on
expenditure in Figure 5 does not contain zero until Rmax exceeds 0.85. For Rmax = 1:3 R2full, the
estimated bounds on patriliny are [ 0:099; 0:0764], implying a consumption wedge of between
7.6% and 9.9%. Thus, in both the expenditure and wage regressions, the required Rmax for the
identied set to include zero is greater than the recommended 1:3  R2full. Similar fan charts for
the regressions on Agriculture - Wage hours and Agriculture + Wage hours are shown in Figures 6
and 7.
Turning to the coe¢ cient of proportionality, a value of  > 1 implies a robust result: especially
in survey data, where questions and control variables are not chosen at random, unobservable
variables are unlikely to carry more explanatory power than observables (Altonji et al. 2005).
Note that a negative value of  implies that controlling for observables increases the value of the
coe¢ cient of interest away from zero, so that unobservables would have to be related to the variable
of interest in the opposite direction to observables. This is the case here for all outcomes except
expenditure and wage hours.
Figure 8 plots the value of , the coe¢ cient of proportionality, for di¤erent values of Rmax, for
those regressions where  is positive. The gure shows that  exceeds one for both coe¢ cients
for most values of Rmax. Taking as a benchmark the values of Rmax = 1:3  R2full, the estimated
coe¢ cient of proportionality is 10.81 for the wage regression and 3.94 for the expenditure regression.
Note that this is for a model that already controls for a rich set of observable measures of geography,
so that selection on unobservables would have to be almost eleven times as strong as selection on
observables such as soil quality, rainfall, plot erosion and temperature to explain the e¤ect of
patriliny on wage labor hours, and almost four times as strong to explain the e¤ect of patriliny on
41 I adapt Osters code to survey data. The adapted Stata code and instructions can be found at
http://selmawalther.weebly.com.
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expenditure.
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Figure 3: Estimated bounds on the coe¢ cient on patriliny in a regression of husbands agricultural
labor supply on controls.
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Figure 4: Estimated bounds on the coe¢ cient on patriliny in a regression of husbands wage labor
hours on controls.
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Figure 5: Estimated bounds on the coe¢ cient on patriliny in a regression of log of household
expenditure on controls.
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Figure 6: Estimated bounds on the coe¢ cient on patriliny in a regression of husbands agricultural
- wage labor hours on controls.
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Figure 7: Estimated bounds on the coe¢ cient on patriliny in a regression of husbands agricultural
+ wage labor hours on controls.
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Figure 8: The estimated  (ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on observables) required
to explain the coe¢ cient on patriliny as being driven by unobservables, as Rmax increases, for log
of household expenditure and wage labor hours. The lowest possible Rmax is that achieved in the
regression with all observable controls, which is why there is no estimated  for expenditure for low
values of Rmax. The Rmax when  = 1 is 0:854 for expenditure and 0:848 for wage hours.
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D Geographical variables
Table 23 lists the geographical variables included in the regressions.
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Table 23: Geographical variables
Category Variable type Level Reference period Description
Temperature Continuous Community 1960-1990 Average daily range: mean of
max. temp.- min. temp.
Temperature Continuous Community 1960-1990 Temperature seasonality:
standard deviation of monthly
climatology
Temperature Continuous Community 1960-1990 Minimum temperature of cold-
est month
Temperature Continuous Community 1960-1990 Average temperature of
wettest quarter
Rainfall Continuous Community 2008-2009, 2009-
2010
Average 12-month total rain-
fall
Rainfall Continuous Community 2008-2009, 2009-
2010
Average total rainfall in
wettest quarter
Rainfall Continuous Community 2008-2009, 2009-
2010
Average start of wettest quar-
ter in dekads, from July on-
wards
Greenness Continuous District 2008-2009, 2009-
2010
Total change in greenness
within the primary growing
season
Greenness Continuous District 2008-2009, 2009-
2010
Onset of greenness increase in
day of year, starting July 1st
Greenness Continuous District 2008-2009, 2009-
2010
Onset of greenness decrease in
day of year, starting July 1st
Soil quality Indicator Household N/A Nutrient availability: 7 cate-
gories dening extent of con-
straint
Soil quality Indicator Household N/A Rooting conditions: 7 cate-
gories dening extent of con-
straint
Soil quality Indicator Household N/A Excess salts: 7 categories
dening extent of constraint
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E GPS Coordinates of pre-Independence Railway Stations
Railway station Latitude Longitude
Limbe -15.8084 35.0574
Malabvi -15.8403 35.1316
Nansadi -15.8833 35.2
Makandi -15.9333 35.2333
Luchenza -16.0101 35.3082
Khonjeni -16.1233 35.2423
Makapwa -16.3333 35.2833
Sandama -16.2073 35.2952
Chipho -16.2893 35.2952
Thekerani -16.3424 35.0994
Thukuta -16.0686 34.8666
Sankhulani -16.2325 35.2847
Osiyana -16.4790 35.1885
Makhanga -15.5408 35.7939
Blantyre -15.7879 35.0159
South Lunzu -15.6527 35.0195
Chilaweni -15.2768 35.7189
Maleule -15.6445 35.0567
Lirangwe -15.5333 35.0167
Namatunu -15.4 35.05
Gwaza -14.8785 34.8114
Shire North -15.2980 35.0799
Utale -15.1667 35.05
Nkaya -15.1282 35.0298
Bazale -15.0167 34.9833
Rivirivi -15.0167 34.9667
Balaka -14.9870 34.9575
Faringdone -14.8318 34.8670
Bilila -14.8167 34.8333
Chinyama -13.0167 33.6833
Lambulira -15.4833 35.3
Mphonde -16.55 34.9
These coordinates were obtained from the following sources: Geo-
graphic.org, Openstreetmap.org and Latlong.net. The GPS coordinates
for Thukuta station are the GPS coordinates of Mfera Health Centre,
which is the closest location with available GPS coordinates.
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